|
|
|
Francione’s
legal and philosophical views are truly original and unique in the
movement, and it is our pleasure to present this interview of Gary
Francione. FoA:
Do you maintain that the animal rights position means that animals
should have all of the same rights as do humans? Gary
Francione: No. I argue that all sentient beings should have one
right: the right not to be treated as our property--the right not
to be valued exclusively as means to human ends. In my newest
book, Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?, I
maintain that if we do not accord animals this one right, then,
despite what we say about how seriously we take animal interests,
we will necessarily treat animals as nothing more than chattel
property. And that is precisely what happens now: We all say that
we take animal interests seriously, but in reality, our society
treats animals in much the same way that it treats any other form
of property. If, however, we did accord animals this one right not
to be treated as property, we would be committed to abolishing and
not merely regulating animal exploitation because our uses of
animals for food, experiments, product testing, entertainment, and
clothing all assume that animals are nothing but property. If we
accepted that animals have the right not to be treated as our
property, we would stop--completely--bringing domestic animals
into existence. I
am not interested in whether a cow should be able to bring a
lawsuit against a farmer; I am interested in why we have the cow
in the first place. FoA:
What is your view of the current animal rights movement in the
United States? Gary
Francione: There is no animal rights movement in the United
States. There is only an animal welfare movement that seeks to
promote the "humane" exploitation of animals. To bring
about animal rights, it is essential to understand the basic legal
and philosophical arguments for abolition. Logically, it is not
possible to reform the system that exploits animals; we must
abolish the exploitation. The abolitionist position is that the
institution of animal property is morally unjustifiable, just as
was the institution of human property that we called slavery. Some
who promote welfare reform maintain that it is acceptable for
humans to use animals if they do so "humanely." Others
seek welfare reforms because they believe reforms will eventually
lead to abolition. I argue against these notions for two reasons. First,
as a theoretical matter, reform misses the primary moral point. It
is, of course, always better to cause less suffering than more,
but the real question is whether humans are justified in imposing
any suffering at all on animals incidental to our use of animals
as property. The 19th century reformers argued that it was better
for a slave's owner to beat his slave four times a week rather
than five. The abolitionists argued that all human beings had at
least the right not to be the property of another; that to be
property meant that a human had no value except that accorded the
slave by the owner. The abolitionist position was that it was
wrong to beat the slaves at all because the institution of slavery
itself was morally unjustifiable and it did not matter how
"humane" we made slavery. Putting a string quartet on
the way to the gas chambers -- as the Nazis did during the
Holocaust -- may make things more "humane" in some
sense, but that misses the point, doesn't it? If
animals are morally significant at all, then we must abolish the
institution of animal property. We must stop creating and owning
domestic animals or using wild animals as means to our ends. My
view is that we should abolish animal slavery and not seek to
reform an inherently immoral institution. The
second reason for my rejection of welfarism is that, as a
practical matter, it does not work. We have had animal welfare
laws in most western countries for well over a hundred years now,
and they have done little to reduce animal suffering and they
certainly have not resulted in the gradual abolition of any
practices. Peter
Singer was recently quoted as saying that the agreement by
McDonald's to give battery hens a few more inches of cage space
was the most significant development for farm animals since he
wrote Animal Liberation. Twenty-five years of welfarist reform and
the best we can show is a larger battery cage. Maybe Peter finds
that thrilling; I do not. It is a clear indication of what I have
been saying for a decade now: welfarist reform is useless. As
to why welfarism fails, this was the subject of my 1996 book, Rain
Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement. In a
nutshell, the reason has to do with the property status of
animals. If animals are property, then they have no value beyond
that which is accorded to them by their owners. Reform does not
work because it seeks to force owners to value their property
differently and to incur costs in order to respect animals
interests. Our legal and political systems are based on strong
concepts of property rights. Thus, there is reluctance to impose
the costs of reforms on owners when such costs will significantly
decrease the value of animal property as far as the owner is
concerned. FoA:
This theory is logical indeed. But what about putting your ideas
into practice at the grass roots level? Gary
Francione: Before undertaking any practical effort, there must be
a theory that informs the action. A social movement must have a
theory if it is to have any action at all. Unfortunately for the
present time, the welfarist position of Peter Singer is informing
the movement. This position claims that advocates should support
any measure that "reduces suffering." This theory has
had disastrous practical results. Nearly any proposed change, such
as giving an extra inch of space to a battery hen, or eating only
non-crate veal, can be portrayed as reducing suffering. Singer's
theory allows large, multi-million-dollar animal welfare
organizations to come up with moderate campaigns and then to
demand that we all jump on the bandwagon because this will
"reduce suffering." Under Singer’s theory, it would
make sense for animal exploiters to make things as horrible as
they can for animals in order to be able to "reduce
suffering" and thereby make small concessions to activists.
That is precisely what the exploiters are doing, with McDonalds’
so-called "improvements" being a perfect example of the
problem. And the "movement" is buying into this because
Singer has declared that these insignificant changes will
"reduce suffering." I
suggest that we need a new theory to replace the one that we have.
I am not unrealistic. I recognize that even if we adopt an
abolitionist theory, abolition will not occur immediately. Change
will necessarily be incremental. But it is my view that the
explicit goal must be abolition and that abolition must shape
incremental change. On
the other hand, I can tell you what really is not realistic, and
that is to expect that the industries who use animals to obtain
profits will be able to police themselves. As I have often noted,
"humane slaughter" laws are difficult to enforce, and
the economic realities of the meat-packing business militate
against conscientious self-enforcement of such standards.
Moreover, such laws arguably increase overall suffering, because
they make the general public feel better about eating meat or
about any other regulated use of animals. This is the Catch-22 of
animal welfare. There
will always be welfarists who promote longer chains for the slaves
and call that incremental change. In Rain Without Thunder, I
argued that the most important form of incremental change is
educating the public about the need for abolition. We have not yet
had that, for the U.S. movement has always been embarrassed about
being "radical." We do not want to alienate the
"mainstream." The problem is that the
"mainstream" is polluted and we ought to stay far away
from the "mainstream." To
those who claim that the abolitionist has no practical campaign to
pursue right now, I have long argued that the contrary is true.
Consider what would happen if the international animal movement
had a sustained and unified campaign promoting a purely vegetarian
diet. Imagine what could be done if a significant portion of our
resources were channeled into making people aware of why they
shouldn't eat animal products at all. At the end of five years, we
would certainly not have achieved world veganism, but we'd
probably have reduced the consumption of animal products
considerably more than we have done with these "eat red
veal" campaigns. And
what would we have given up if we were to pursue this route? Peter
Singer claims that two inches of cage space is the best thing to
happen to farmed animals in 25 years; arguably, making as few as
100 new vegans in five years would "reduce suffering"
much more than that. When
will we begin? I understand, of course, that many people in
leadership positions aren't vegan. Therefore they find it
difficult to embrace animal rights as a movement in which a
vegetable-based diet is an axiom. Veganism, however, is the single
most important issue in the movement. Veganism is the abolitionist
principle implemented in one's own life. Anyone who maintains that
she or he is an "animal rights" advocate but is not
vegan cannot be taken seriously. FoA:
Doesn't that exclude a lot of well-meaning people? Gary
Francione: Many advocates do claim that it is "elitist"
to maintain that there are moral baselines, such as veganism. But
that is like saying that it is "elitist" to say
feminists must reject rape. It is simply inconsistent to maintain
that you accept an animal rights position but continue to consume
animals. Many advocates seem to think that veganism is optional
and that it is only the "vegan police" who insist on
veganism. That is no different from saying, in the context of
advocacy for children’s rights, that those who condemn all
pedophilia are "pedophilia police." If a children’s
rights advocate is not a member of the "pedophilia
police," she isn’t an advocate for children’s rights. FoA:
Are there further impediments to getting the movement off the
ground? Gary
Francione: The animal rights position holds that institutional
exploitation ought to be abolished and not merely regulated. But
the various groups and institutions who involve themselves in
animal advocacy are aware that the abolitionist perspective might
offend some donors. Because of this, the position of many groups
is defined solely by the donor dollars. FoA:
And if they do not work to abolish animal ownership, we inevitably
get a doomed welfare platform? Gary
Francione: Exactly right. And animal welfare -- both as a moral
theory and as a legal principle -- requires in part that we
balance human interests against nonhuman interests to determine
whether a particular animal use or treatment is
"necessary." If the human interest outweighs the
nonhuman interest, the use or treatment is considered
"necessary" and morally or legally justifiable. If the
animal interest outweighs the human interest, then the use is
considered "unnecessary" and morally and legally
unjustifiable. As
my 1995 book Animals, Property, and the Law explains, the problem
is that because animals are property, what we really balance is
the interest of property owners against their property. And that
is absurd. It makes no sense to talk about the interests of
property which has only the value accorded to it by its owner.
That is precisely why the laws that purported to regulate
race-based slavery in the U.S. completely failed to protect the
interests of slaves. It was simply not possible to balance the
interests of a slave against those of a slave owner. The slave was
a piece of property, a thing that was owned. As a matter of logic,
we cannot balance nonhuman' interests against ours, any more than
we can balance our interests against those of our cars or
wristwatches. FoA:
You are a law professor. What do you say to those who maintain
that your views are specific to someone trained by the legal
profession? Gary
Francione: I have no illusions about the usefulness of the legal
system. Veterinary malpractice cases, cruelty cases, and cases
brought under the Animal Welfare Act are pretty much meaningless
in terms of reducing suffering, and have absolutely no effect on
the property status of animals. But they have created job security
for lawyers. Anna Charlton, who has taught the animal rights law
course with me at Rutgers University for over a decade, often
points out that the legal system will never respond differently to
animal issues unless and until there is a significant shift in
prevailing social consensus about animal exploitation. For the
most part, the law reflects social attitudes and does not form
them. This is particularly true when the behavior in question is
deeply embedded in the cultural fabric, as our exploitation of
animals undoubtedly is. As long as most people think that it’s
fine to eat animals, use them in experiments, or use them for
entertainment purposes, the law is not likely to be a particularly
useful tool to help animals. If, for example, Congress or a state
legislature abolished factory farming, that would drive the cost
of meat up and there would be a social revolt! There are some
lawyers, such as those involved with the Animal Legal Defense
Fund, who promote the notion that law will be at the forefront of
social change for animals. But these people make a living from
practicing law and they are not likely to say otherwise, are they?
Nonhumans
will continue to be exploited until there is a revolution of the
human spirit, and that will not happen without visionaries trying
to change the paradigm that has become accustomed to and tolerant
of patriarchal violence. At this moment, the job of the animal
rights lawyer is not to be the primary force for change within the
system. As lawyers, we are part of the system that exists to
protect property interests. William Kunstler, although the most
prominent civil rights lawyer of the 20th century, nevertheless
once said to me that I should never think that the lawyer is the
"star" of the show. Our job as lawyers is to keep social
activists out of harm's way. In my view, a useful "animal
rights" lawyer is a criminal lawyer one day, helping
activists who are charged with civil disobedience; an
administrative lawyer the next day, helping activists obtain
permits for demonstrations; and a constitutional lawyer the next
day, helping students who do not want to vivisect as part of their
course work, or helping prisoners who want vegan food. But the
lawyer always serves and protects the activist. It is the activist
who helps to change the paradigm. Without committed clients who
reflect a growing social consensus, lawyers are useless. Inasmuch
as I maintain the necessity of revolution, let me make clear what
I mean. I am absolutely and unequivocally opposed to any sort of
violence directed toward humans or nonhuman. I am firmly committed
to the principle of non-violence. The revolution I seek is one
from the heart: I try to get people -- especially other men -- to
question and reject violence. I am interested in overthrowing
patriarchy and the idea that some beings -- whether white, rich
males or white males or humans generally --have greater worth than
other beings. FoA:
What about the work being done on the subject of ape personhood
issues: wouldn't this be one example of movement within the system
that moves us along toward a society that is serious about
equality? Gary
Francione: There are at least two serious problems with the ape
personhood campaign. First, the campaign reinforces the notion
that some animals are better than others because they are more
"like us." That is, instead of having humans at the top
and all nonhuman on the bottom, we "allow" a few animals
that are "like us" to come on over to "our"
side. That leaves the vast majority of the "other"
animals still on the bottom and without even a hope of moving
"up" because they lack human-like characteristics that
make "special" those animals given admission into the
preferred category. In other words, the campaign for ape
personhood threatens to substitute one hierarchy for another, and
I am concerned that we eradicate the notion of hierarchy
altogether. Second,
the "ape personhood" campaign is not only theoretically
unsound, but has terrible practical consequences for animals.
There is now an entire cottage industry of cognitive ethologists,
inspired by Jane Goodall, who are urging that we must do more
experiments in order to show how "like us" various apes
are. I recently attended a conference at which various researchers
were talking about the various experiments that they are presently
doing and that should be done in the future to determine exactly
how much "like us" apes are. How much more
"research" will be necessary? How "like us" do
these animals have to be before they get "promoted" in
this hierarchy? I think that the "ape personhood"
campaign has more to do with generating grants for researchers and
certain "apes rights" lawyers than it has to do with
animal liberation. Instead of insisting on liberation of animals
from human constructs, a great deal of attention has focused on
the idea, for example, of Koko the gorilla giving live chats on
America Online. There is unprecedented interest in people who
discuss intergenerational studies of language or some other form
of cognition. Enough is enough. The focus ought to be a respect
for their home environments, not circus-like parading of apes who
have been carefully trained to act the way humans do. Does the
fact that this is done under a scientific gloss make this any less
of a circus? Does the fact that this is done in a courtroom by a
bunch of lawyers make it any less of a circus? These antics show a
lack of sensitivity about the past four decades of grotesque
mistreatment endured by apes in human-created settings. We already
know that the other apes have complex lives and share a notably
similar genetic build. So why do we keep imposing human
communication tests, self-recognition tests, and numerous human
social interactions on them? FoA:
But weren't you a contributor to The Great Ape Project? Gary
Francione: Yes. In 1993, I wrote an essay entitled
"Personhood, Property, and Legal Competence" which was
included in The Great Ape Project and I was one of the original
signatories of the Declaration on the Rights of Great Apes. I was
the first legal theorist to propose a theory of legal personhood
for the great apes. But I was very careful in my 1993 essay to
make the point that although the great apes were very similar to
humans, that similarity was sufficient for their being legal
persons but was not necessary. That is, I argued that the only
characteristic that is required for personhood is sentience. If a
nonhuman can feel pain, then we have a moral obligation not to
treat that nonhuman exclusively as a means to our ends. If that
being has other interests, then we ought to respect those
interests as well, but a theory of rights should not be connected
to this additional set of interests beyond sentience. To put the
matter another way: just because a cow does not have the same
cognitive characteristics as does a chimpanzee does mean that it
is OK to eat cow any more than the fact that the cow may have
different characteristics from a fish mean that it is OK to eat
the fish. This is a central point in my newest book, Introduction
to Animal Rights: sentience is the only characteristic that is
necessary to have the right not to be treated as a thing or as
property. Jane Goodall is currently urging that African people eat
goats instead of chimpanzees. Why? Because chimpanzees are more
"like us" than are goats? This makes no sense to me and
Goodall's position is the antithesis of the animal rights view. FoA:
For other animals, what are the implications of this shift in
focus (from sentience to knowledge)? Gary
Francione: We find animal advocates singing the praises of
mathematically gifted parrots, perceptive rescue dogs, and other
animals with impressive talents -- particularly those whose
intelligence can somehow be put to our use. FoA:
So we need to do away with seeing-eye dogs? Gary
Francione: If we are serious about animal rights, we have a
responsibility to stop bringing them into existence for our
purposes. We would stop bringing all domestic animals into
existence for human purposes. FoA:
We have discussed, in previous issues, your views on the law known
as the CHIMP Act. Tragically, your warnings were not heeded. And,
as you had predicted, a law that further entrenches the property
status of nonhuman apes has passed. What does this portend? Gary
Francione: This terrible law was supported by PeTA, the National
Antivivisection Society, the American Antivivisection Society, and
prominent board members of the New England Antivivisection
Society. Such support was a clear signal to the scientists that
they may proceed with their business of psychological and
biomedical research, and that they may do so unhindered -- even
supported -- by groups who have spoken out in the past against
such things. We now see that the vivisectors can get PeTA, the
"antivivisection" groups, and Jane Goodall on their
side. What does this portend for the future? It is fairly clear
that the use of animals in experiments may proceed without any
serious critique from the animal movement; indeed, the animal
movement is actually decreasing its opposition to vivisection. FoA:
We had better wake up the movement quickly then. You mentioned
Peter Singer and PeTA as not promoting the idea of abolishing
property status. But both seem central to the public idea of what
animal rights people do. Can they be considered responsible for
the advocacy movement's ineffective position? Gary
Francione: Ironically, Singer and PeTA together have eviscerated
the animal rights movement in the United States. PeTA president
Ingrid Newkirk has informed us that Peter Singer is an
intellectual who looks at all nuances of an issue. Newkirk was
defending an essay called "Heavy Petting," in which
Singer had something nice to say about the idea of having sex with
calves -- sex with baby cows. I quote: "They have penises and
vaginas, as we do, and the fact that the vagina of a calf can be
sexually satisfying to a man shows how similar these organs
are." Now, I can appreciate a good nuance now and then, but I
draw the line at baby cows. And
then we've got PeTA bringing Playboy models to Capitol Hill, to
attract the attention of legislators. PeTA trivializes activism
just as Peter Singer trivializes the theory of animal rights.
Combined, these people have managed to turn a serious idea into a
peep show. I
think some of these leaders need to take some time off to learn
how to respect human personhood before they continue their
campaigns. Instead of thinking about intellectual nuances, PeTA
ought to pay attention to the rather obvious fact that to link
animal rights with Playboy's philosophy sends a profoundly
disturbing message. If animal rights can make room for
pornography, what kind of social movement is that? Some critics
have said that the animal rights movement is corroded by the
attitudes of people who do not like other human beings. It's time
to consider this criticism seriously. Fundamentally there is no
difference between the idea of treating other human beings
respectfully and treating other animals respectfully. Our
campaigns must think in holistic terms. I
would encourage animals advocates to understand a fundamental
principle: radical change -- change at the very roots -- cannot be
imposed by large corporations or by the charities who court them.
And be careful too of "experts." When we identify a
particular person or group, rather than an idea, as the central
focus of the movement, we give a great deal of authority to that
person who can then do a great deal of damage to the movement. An
example of this phenomenon is Singer himself. Advocates have
allowed -- even encouraged and facilitated -- his putting himself
forward as the definitive spokesperson for "animal
rights." Anyone who has read Animal Liberation with care
knows that Peter Singer does not endorse rights for animals or
humans. He has consistently maintained that it is morally
acceptable to eat animals and use them in other ways (as long as
we take seriously their interest in not suffering). He also
regards it as acceptable to kill disabled human infants and to use
humans as unconsenting subjects in biomedical research in some
circumstances. Recently, Singer condoned some acts of sex between
humans and nonhumans. The movement has set Singer up as some type
of deity. To disagree with Singer's views is interpreted by many
as an act of disloyalty to the cause of animal rights. The result
is that the movement is now saddled with a representative who
praises McDonald's, who espouses the view that humans with lives
somehow considered as having lesser value can be sacrificed for
the rest of us, and who announces that "mutually
satisfying" sexual relationships may develop between humans
and nonhuman animals. FoA:
You have spoken about "moral schizophrenia" in the human
attitude toward other animals. What do you mean by this? Gary
Francione: Many of us live with dogs, cats, or other animals and
regard them as family members. Yet we stick dinner forks into
other animals who are no different from the ones we consider
family members. This is odd behavior when you think about it. And
on the broader social level, nearly everyone would agree that it
is immoral to impose unnecessary suffering on animals -- which, by
any definition of the term, means that it can't be right to impose
suffering on them for human amusement, pleasure, or convenience.
After all, a rule that says it is wrong to impose suffering on
animals unless we find it pleasurable and amusing would sound
silly. And yet, 99.9 percent of our use of other animals cannot be
justified by any reason other than human amusement and
convenience. It is 2002. No one maintains that we need to eat meat
to lead an optimally healthy lifestyle. Indeed, an increasing
number of health care professionals warn that eating meat and
dairy is detrimental to human health. And animal agriculture is an
ecological disaster. It takes between six and 12 pounds of plant
protein to produce one pound of animal protein and it takes about
100 times more water to produce a pound of flesh than a pound of
wheat. Our best justification for eating meat is that it tastes
good. Our best justification for rodeos, circuses, zoos, hunting,
and so forth is entertainment. In short, western culture claims to
take animal interests seriously, and we all claim to eschew
unnecessary suffering; yet we impose suffering and death on
animals in situations that cannot be described as involving
necessity of any sort. That is what I call "moral
schizophrenia." FoA:
Have you changed your views on theory or activism over the years? Gary
Francione: I have changed my viewpoint, yes. I started by
supporting the welfarist approach. That is, when I first got into
this, I believed that we should pursue improvements in the
animals' living conditions. I thought that the emphasis on their
conditions would lead to the abolition of the use industries. Over
the years it has become entirely clear to me that animal welfare
leads us only to more animal welfare. If we were protesting the
establishment of a concentration camp, would it be appropriate to
ask for improvements to the camp? No, because at some level one is
undoubtedly conveying the message that the camp is okay. The only
appropriate thing to do in this circumstance is to get rid of the
camp, because the idea of the camp is the fundamental problem. The
issue is not how it goes about its business, but its very
existence. FoA:
Many welfarists claim that your views are "divisive."
How do you respond? Gary
Francione: To disagree is not to be "divisive." I
disagree with the welfarists. I regard welfarism as ineffective
and counterproductive. I think that the empirical evidence is
absolutely clear that welfarism does not work. Despite all of the
welfarist campaigns of the last century, we are using more animals
now in more horrific ways than ever before in human history. But
there is a deeper point here: There is no tradition of debate
within the American animal movement. If one of the large groups
announces some campaign, we are all expected to jump on board or
be declared "traitors." Peter Singer and Ingrid Newkirk
recently complained that I attacked their views but that we were
all "on the same side." If there is one thing that of
which I am certain, I am not "on the same side" as Peter
and Ingrid. Our views are very different. Our goals are very
different. We need more disagreement within the movement, not
less. And we should not be afraid of being labeled as
"divisive." That is a label used by those who have
nothing of substance to say in response to legitimate criticisms
or observations. FoA:
Some people would say that your theory of animal rights is an
all-or-nothing approach, and that it is unfair not to provide
welfare improvements for the animals who are alive and suffering
now. Given that it will take a long time before animal rights are
acknowledged and established, is there any way we can help animals
who are suffering today? Gary
Francione: Become a vegan and spend at least one hour of every day
educating your family, friends, neighbors, and anyone else who
will listen to you about the moral and environmental arguments in
favor of veganism. I can guarantee you that at the end of a year,
you will have done more to bring about abolitionist change--and to
set the stage for more abolitionist change--than you will have
done spending time on getting battery cages made larger or working
for more "humane" slaughterhouses. If you want to
participate in legislative campaigns, pursue campaigns that are
abolitionist and not reformist. In Rain Without Thunder, I
discussed criteria for identifying abolitionist campaigns. But I
cannot emphasize enough that the most important step is to go
vegan and to support vegan education programs. Welfarist campaigns
may make us feel better, but they do nothing to alleviate animal
suffering. FoA:
What do you think about Burger King's new veggie burger? Gary
Francione: In the first place, the "veggie burger" is
not "veggie" at all. The burger is cooked on the same
grill as are the meat products, and the bun contains dairy
products. But even if the "veggie burger" were vegan, it
is my view that animal advocates have no business promoting
outfits such as Burger King and McDonald's. I'm not recommending
that we sit on the sidelines and rattle on about rights theory all
the time. As I have stated, I'm intensely supportive of vegan
campaigns. I would, however, urge activists to carefully consider
where and how to implement these campaigns. There are better ways
to promote a vegan diet than advertising huge fast-food
corporations, which are exploitative of animals and the
environment on so many levels. We should be promoting vegan
restaurants and shops; we should not be encouraging people to eat
at Burger King. The fact that Burger King has a "veggie
burger" (that isn't even vegan) is no different from the fact
that Burger King has salads. Should we all rush to Burger King
because they have salads? Of course not. I have noticed in recent
press that both Burger King and McDonalds are becoming to be
viewed as allied with the "animal rights" movement. As
far as I am concerned, corporations like that are not allied with
any movement in which I have any interest. FoA:
Great advice. Would you have any more for us? Gary
Francione: I was recently asked by some animal advocates to write
down a set of principles that might be used as shorthand for what
I regard as the moral baselines of a real animal rights movement.
I'm happy to share them with your readers. COPY
FROM HERE DOWN AND SPREAD AROUND PERIODICALLY PLEASE! BEST
SIX REASONS TO LIBERATE ANIMALS! 1.
The animal rights position maintains that all sentient beings,
humans or nonhuman, have one right: the basic right not to be
treated as the property of others. 2.
Our recognition of the one basic right means that we must abolish,
and not merely regulate, institutionalized animal exploitation --
because it assumes that animals are the property of humans. 3.
Just as we reject racism, sexism, ageism, and homophobia, we
reject speciesism. The species of a sentient being is no more
reason to deny the protection of this basic right than race, sex,
age, or sexual orientation is a reason to deny membership in the
human moral community to other humans. 4.
We recognize that we will not abolish overnight the property
status of nonhumans, but we will support only those campaigns and
positions that explicitly promote the abolitionist agenda. We will
not support positions that call for supposedly
"improved" regulation of animal exploitation. We reject
any campaign that promotes sexism, racism, homophobia or other
forms of discrimination against humans. 5.
We recognize that the most important step that any of us can take
toward abolition is to adopt the vegan lifestyle and to educate
others about veganism. Veganism is the principle of abolition
applied to one’s personal life and the consumption of any meat,
fowl, fish, or diary product, or the wearing or use of animal
products, is inconsistent with the abolitionist perspective. 6.
We recognize the principle of nonviolence as the guiding principle
of the animal rights movement. Professor
of Law Gary L. Francione Gary
L. Francione taught the first course on animal rights and the law
in an American law school in 1989. His most recent book is
Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Temple
University Press, 2000). His other books include: Animals,
Property, and the Law (Temple University Press, 1995), and Rain
Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement
(Temple University Press, 1996) Professor Francione co-authored
(with Anna Charlton) Vivisection and Dissection in the Classroom:
A Guide to Conscientious Objection, which has been used
successfully by students across the country and around the world
to obtain alternatives to animal use in the classroom. For ten
years, he and Rutgers Adjunct Professor Anna Charlton operated the
Rutgers Animal Rights Law Clinic, which provided free legal
services to animal advocates and served as the nation’s animal
law "think tank." The resources developed by the Clinic
may be found at <http://www.animal-law.org/>
FOR
THOSE WHO DON'T HAVE COMPUTER:
Professor
Gary L. Francione
|
