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Animals and us: Our
hypocrisy
* 04 June 2005
* NewScientist.com news service
* Gary L. Francione
Gary L. Francione is professor of law and Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach
Distinguished Scholar of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers
University School
of Law in New Jersey. His books include Introduction to Animal
Rights:
Your child or the dog? (2000), Rain Without Thunder: The
ideology of the
animal rights movement (1996) and Animals, Property, and the Law
(1995),
all published by Temple University Press. Francione has been
teaching
animal rights and the law for more than 20 years
DO GREAT apes, dolphins, parrots, and perhaps even "food"
animals have
certain cognitive characteristics that entitle them to be
accorded
greater moral consideration and legal protection?
A considerable literature has so argued in recent times. The
central
idea behind this enterprise is the notion that we must rethink
our
relationship with non-humans if we find they are intelligent,
self-aware, or have emotions. To the extent that non-humans have
minds
like ours, runs the argument, they have similar interests, and
they are
entitled to greater protection because of those interests. This
"similar-minds" approach has spawned an industry of cognitive
ethologists eager to investigate - ironically often through
various
sorts of animal experiments - the extent to which they are like
us.
It is astonishing that 150 years after Darwin, we are still so
surprised
that other animals may have some of the characteristics thought
to be
uniquely human. The proposition that humans have mental
characteristics
wholly absent in non-humans is inconsistent with the theory of
evolution. Darwin maintained that there are no uniquely human
characteristics, and that there were only quantitative and not
qualitative differences between human and non-human minds. He
argued
that non-humans can think and reason, and possess many of the
same
emotional attributes as humans.
What is more troubling about the similar-minds approach is its
implications for moral theory. Although it appears to be
progressive, to
indicate that we really are evolving in our moral relationship
with
other species, the similar-minds approach actually reinforces
the very
paradigm that has resulted in our excluding non-humans from the
moral
community. We have historically justified our exploitation of
non-humans
on the ground that there is a qualitative distinction between
humans and
other animals: the latter may be sentient, but they are not
intelligent,
rational, emotional or self-conscious.
Although the similar-minds approach claims that, empirically, we
may
have been wrong in the past and at least some non-humans may
have some
of these characteristics, it does not question the underlying
assumption
that a characteristic other than sentience - the ability to feel
pain -
is necessary for moral significance.
Arbitrary lines
Any attempt to justify our exploitation of non-humans based on
their
lack of "human" characteristics begs the moral question by
assuming that
certain characteristics are special and justify differential
treatment.
Even if, for instance, humans are the only animals who can
recognise
themselves in mirrors or can communicate through symbolic
language, no
human is capable of flying, or breathing under water without
assistance.
What makes the ability to recognise oneself in a mirror or use
symbolic
language better in a moral sense than the ability to fly or
breathe
under water? The answer, of course, is that we say so and it is
in our
interest to say so.
Aside from self-interest, there is no reason to conclude that
characteristics thought to be uniquely human have any value that
allows
us to use them as a non-arbitrary justification for exploiting
non-humans. Moreover, even if all animals other than humans were
to lack
a particular characteristic beyond sentience, or to possess that
characteristic to a lesser degree than humans, such a difference
cannot
justify human exploitation of non-humans.
Differences between humans and other animals may be relevant for
other
purposes. No sensible person argues that non-human animals
should drive
cars, vote or attend universities, but such differences have no
bearing
on whether we should eat non-humans or use them in experiments.
We
recognise this conclusion when it comes to humans. Whatever
characteristic we identify as uniquely human will be seen to a
lesser
degree in some humans and not at all in others. Some humans will
have
the same deficiency that we attribute to non-humans, and
although the
deficiency may be relevant for some purposes, it is not relevant
to
whether we exploit such humans.
Consider, for instance, self-consciousness. Any sentient being
must have
some level of self-awareness. To be sentient means to be the
sort of
being who recognises that it is that being, and not some other,
who is
experiencing pain or distress. Even if we arbitrarily define
self-consciousness in an exclusively human way as, say, being
able to
think about thinking, many humans, including those who are
severely
mentally disabled, lack that type of consciousness. Again, this
"deficiency" may be relevant for some purposes, but it has no
bearing on
whether we should use such humans in painful biomedical
experiments or
as forced organ donors. In the end, the only difference between
humans
and non-humans is species, and species is no more a
justification for
exploitation than race, sex or sexual orientation.
This is why the similar-minds approach is misguided, and will
only
create new speciesist hierarchies, in which we move some
non-humans,
such as the great apes or dolphins, into a preferred group, and
continue
to treat all others as things lacking morally significant
interests.
If, however, we want to think seriously about the
human/non-human
relationship, we need to focus on one, and only one,
characteristic:
sentience. What is ironic is that we claim to take the suffering
of
non-humans seriously. As a matter of social morality, we are
virtually
unanimous in agreeing that it is morally wrong to inflict
"unnecessary"
suffering or death on non-humans. For such a prohibition to have
any
meaning, it must preclude inflicting suffering on non-humans
merely for
our pleasure, amusement or convenience.
The problem is that although we express disapproval of the
unnecessary
suffering of non-humans, most of their suffering and death can
be
justified only by our pleasure, amusement or convenience, and
cannot by
any stretch be plausibly characterised as "necessary". We kill
billions
of animals annually for food. It is not "necessary" in any sense
to eat
meat or animal products. Indeed, an increasing number of
healthcare
professionals maintain that these foods may be detrimental to
human
health. Moreover, environmental scientists have pointed out the
tremendous inefficiencies and costs to our planet of animal
agriculture.
In any event, our justification for the pain, suffering and
death
inflicted on these farmed non-humans is nothing more than our
enjoyment
of the taste of their flesh.
And it is certainly not necessary to use non-humans for sport,
hunting,
entertainment or product testing, and there is considerable
evidence
that reliance on animal models in experiments or drug testing
may even
be counterproductive.
In sum, when it comes to non-humans, we exhibit what can best be
described as moral schizophrenia. We say one thing about how
non-humans
should be treated, and do quite another. We are, of course,
aware that
we lack a satisfactory approach to the matter of our
relationship to
other animals, and we have for some time now been trying to find
one.
If we took seriously the principle that it was wrong to inflict
unnecessary suffering on non-humans, we would stop altogether
bringing
domestic animals into existence for human use, and our
recognition of
the moral status of animals would not depend on whether a parrot
can
understand mathematics or a dog recognise herself in a mirror.
We would
take seriously what Jeremy Bentham said over 200 years ago: "The
question is not, can they reason, nor can they talk, but can
they
suffer?"
“Oh hyena, don't give me reasons why you're eating me
(Ethiopian)”
“Take a small piece of a hippopotamus testicle in water. This,
according
to Pliny the Elder, is a sure cure for snakebite. He also
advises lion's
fat and rose oil for a spotless complexion. And the touch of an
elephant's trunk will relieve a headache, "more particularly" if
the
animal happens to sneeze at the same time.The Natural History by
Pliny
the Elder,
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/> www.perseus.tufts.edu”
>From issue 2502 of New Scientist magazine, 04 June 2005, page
51
Núria Querol i Viñas <mailto:n.querol@altarriba.org>
n.querol@altarriba.org
Relaciones Internacionales| International Relationships
Fundación Altarriba, Amigos de los Animales
c/Pau Claris 87
08010, Barcelona Tel. +34 93 412 00 73
<http://www.altarriba.org/> www.altarriba.org
www.gevha.com <http://www.gevha.com/> Violencia
Humanos-Animales
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